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Abstract 
In this paper I defend Gadamer’s claim that the scope of hermeneutical reflection is 
universal. I consider Habermas’s critique of Gadamer – in particular, his 
objection that language and tradition are ideological. I argue that Gadamer’s 
elaboration of the historical ground of hermeneutic experience supports the key 
implication of his understanding of the relationship between thinking and being, 
which is that the conditions for reflection upon our preconceptions of meaning are 
themselves mediated through language as effective history. In response to 
Habermas’s criticisms, hermeneutical reflection is therefore able to emancipate the 
interpreter from ideological forms of consciousness by understanding them as 
effective history. 
Gadamer has been criticized for his lack of reflection on the 
conditions that make it possible to distinguish between true and false 
preconceptions of meaning. Critics have claimed, on the one hand, 
that the priority he lends to tradition puts too much constraint on the 
scope of interpretation, and, on the other, that prioritizing the 
essential openness and productivity of interpretation threatens to 
relativize truth. Attempts to mediate this dilemma tend to focus on 
the dialogical structure of hermeneutics.1 A dialogue has a minimal 
______________ 
* The author is a PhD candidate in philosophy (University of Ottawa). 
1 E.g., Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism : Science, 
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1983), p. 155 ; Steven Cauchon, “Openness to Critical Reflection : Ghandi 
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justificatory demand that implies some form of critical reflection. In 
this respect, Jürgen Habermas becomes a valuable critic of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. In his view, Gadamer correctly emphasizes the 
inherently reflective dimension of thought and language, which 
produces an agreement, but overlooks the fact that language and 
tradition can preserve forms of ideology that distort understanding. 
Habermas concludes that the critical apparatus that hermeneutics 
requires cannot itself be conditioned by language or tradition. In this 
essay, we will consider some of Habermas’s and Gadamer’s 
arguments for and against the universality of language and tradition. 
Ultimately this paper favours Gadamer’s approach, which finds that 
the conditions for truth are apprehended through our consciousness 
of language as effective history. 
Basic to Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutic experience is the fact that 
we are constantly confronted with other possibilities of meaning, 
whose validity, as determined in a dialogue, contributes to a more 
comprehensive understanding of things. An essential factor in 
hermeneutic experience is thus the pre-interpretive stance that one 
inherits from tradition. This is what Gadamer calls a “prejudice,” 
whose positive meaning he rescues from the Enlightenment’s so-
called “prejudice against prejudice.”2 All hermeneutical understanding 
involves a preconception of meaning as a necessary first step toward 
gaining substantial knowledge of the subject at hand. Hermeneutic 
experience is also essentially an open and unending process. Gadamer 
is describing the conditions under which understanding is possible 
and productive, and so the question of the completion of knowledge 
does not apply. Yet this is not to say that the object of understanding, 
the “things themselves” (die Sache), are themselves incomplete. It is 
just that our understanding of these things is never complete and is 
constantly developing. Thus, while understanding always anticipates 
                                                                                                     
beyond Gadamer,” in Inheriting Gadamer : New Directions in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, ed. Georgia Warnke (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 
2016), p. 102-120, here p. 102. 
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (London : Continuum Publishing Group, 
2006), p. 274-285. 
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the completeness of its object,3 insight into the totality of things can 
only ever be partial. 
The back-and-forth movement between prejudice and 
interpretation is captured in the image of the hermeneutical circle. 
Gadamer appropriates Heidegger’s description of the hermeneutical 
circle as part of the ontological structure of understanding.4 On this 
view, drawing out the implications of the fore-conception of meaning 
alters not only our preconception of meaning but also the content of 
the tradition that supplies this fore-conception in the first place. 
“Tradition,” Gadamer writes, “is not simply a permanent 
precondition ; rather, we produce it ourselves inasmuch as we 
understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence 
further determine it ourselves.”5 This is not just a logical or 
epistemological claim. Referring again to Heidegger’s demonstration 
of the productivity of the hermeneutical circle, Gadamer writes, “It is 
not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our 
being.”6 Understanding is self-understanding, and so our constant 
involvement in the search for knowledge is an ongoing search for 
self-knowledge.7 
Both Gadamer and Habermas are critical of the “naïve 
objectivism” of a positivistic approach to truth and the articulation of 
meaning.8 For his part, Habermas finds that positivism does not 
______________ 
3 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (London : Continuum Publishing Group, 
2006), p. 294. 
4 Ibid., p. 293-294. 
5 Ibid., p. 293. 
6 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Ling 
(Berkeley : University of California Press, 1976), p. 9. 
7 Earlier approaches to hermeneutics presuppose that the object under 
investigation can be understood as a complete whole by knowing the 
correlation between all of its parts. Gadamer explains that in the 19th 
century, “the circular movement of understanding runs backward and 
forward along the text, and ceases when the text is perfectly understood” 
(Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 293). Thus Schleiermacher, for example, 
developed hermeneutics as a methodological tool to assist other fields attain 
their ideal of epistemological certainty. 
8 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 27 ; sc. Georgia Warnke, Gadamer : 
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1987), 
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properly attend to the essential, practical dimension of language that 
presents a “lifeworld.” He criticizes Wittgenstein, for example, for 
remaining too restrictive in his approach to language games and 
failing to appreciate that “the application of rules [in a language game] 
includes their interpretation and further development.”9 In his view, 
however, Gadamer has gone too far in the opposite direction by 
creating an “abstract opposition between hermeneutic experience and 
methodical knowledge as a whole.”10 Habermas thinks that the 
“confrontation” between truth and method establishes the basis of 
the hermeneutical sciences such that it is a mistake to try to separate 
the hermeneutic phenomenon from “the business of methodology.”11 
As we will see, Habermas does not appeal to Kantian, a priori 
categories of truth. Rather, he proposes that our practical 
involvement in a social community allows us to interpret empirically 
the transcendental structure of our “lifeworld,” within which a 
consensus is possible that is free from coercion and force.12 
There are two principle conditions that a hermeneutical dialogue 
must satisfy in order to successfully obtain a genuine understanding 
between the interlocutors. First, they must agree on the subject 
matter that they have in common and whose nature they wish to 
uncover. Second, they must be open to the possibility that what the 
other says about this subject matter is true, even if this entails a 
contradiction. Central to Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory is that this 
second condition, especially, forces the interlocutors to bring into 
question the hidden prejudices or biases that form the basis of their 
claims. Arguably, however, Gadamer leaves open the possibility that 
                                                                                                     
p. 108 ; and Richard Bernstein, “The Constellation of Hermeneutics, Critical 
Theory and Deconstruction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, ed. 
Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 267-
282, here p. 268. 
9 Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 1988), 
p. 148. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 167. 
12 Demetrius Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding : A Study of the 
Habermas-Gadamer Debate (London and Toronto : Associated University 
Presses, 1995), p. 100. 
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under certain circumstances an understanding can be reached that 
does not require this moment of critical reflection. He describes 
classical texts, for example, as having a timeless quality that resists 
historical criticism.13 In Habermas’s view, tradition itself has become 
this kind of authority in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Thus, while he 
agrees with Gadamer that understanding is a matter of consensus,14 
he argues that Gadamer overlooks the possibility that this consensus 
may be “systematically distorted” due to a lack of critical reflection 
upon its ideological basis.15 
Habermas reasonably illustrates that there are conditions for the 
truth of judgments that extend beyond the scope of hermeneutical 
reflection. Habermas argues therefore that the hermeneutical event of 
truth must be situated within a larger framework that can reveal when 
this event is the product of distortion. What hermeneutics requires in 
his view is “a system of reference that transcends the context of 
tradition as such.”16 As the medium of tradition, language is also a 
medium of domination and force, and therefore is itself ideological 
and deceptive.17 Thus the framework that Habermas wants to 
develop must transcend the medium of language as well. 
Gadamer, by contrast, elevates tradition to the level of a 
transcendental subject, the apprehension of which belongs to the 
historically effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein). 
He strongly insists against Habermas that hermeneutical reflection is 
therefore a universal phenomenon. Elaborating on his claim that 
“being that can be understood is language,”18 he says that this should 
not be understood as a metaphysical assertion but rather as a 
description of the “unrestricted scope possessed by the hermeneutical 
perspective.”19 This amounts to saying that language, as the medium 
of the universal, hermeneutical phenomenon, also mediates the 
conditions that discriminate between valid and invalid judgments. 
Defending Gadamer’s claim concerning the universality of 
______________ 
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 288. 
14 Habermas, Logic, p. 164. 
15 Sc. Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 111. 
16 Habermas, Logic, p. 170. 
17 Ibid., p. 172. 
18 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 470. 
19 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 103. 
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hermeneutical experience will therefore support the universality of 
language as the medium of this experience and the conditions for 
truth. 
Habermas and the Critique of Ideology 
Like Gadamer, Habermas is concerned with the conditions under 
which coming to a shared understanding becomes possible. 
Developing a theory of activity within a social framework, he views 
the problem of understanding in the context of human action 
interpreted within historical and social processes.20 Habermas makes a 
similar distinction as Gadamer between the natural and social 
sciences, which he terms empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic 
respectively. The articulation of meaning within the social sciences 
thus entails a double hermeneutic : coming to a shared understanding 
requires a sensitivity to both the normative framework that 
establishes a set of shared social values, practices, and beliefs, as well 
as the contingent circumstances of actions within this framework that 
illustrate their intentionality. The positivist framework of empirical-
analytic science would thus entail “detaching theory from the 
hermeneutic situation in which it is formulated and separating 
actions, norms of actions and the like from the language games that 
give them their sense.”21 Coming to a shared understanding within 
the social sciences is thus a matter of knowing both the theoretical 
framework that dictates how forms of communication are 
constructed and the practical sense in which language is actually used 
to express meaning or intention. 
Habermas is critical of the attempt to ground the social sciences 
within a theory of linguistic analysis. In his view, this approach 
incorrectly assumes the possibility of a “pure theory” – that is, a 
metalanguage with which it is possible to give a formal, external 
description of a culture and its social processes.22 If such a 
description were possible, the linguistic analyst would be able to 
adopt an alternative form of life freely – that is, without needing a 
point of reference in the form of life he or she has left behind. 
______________ 
20 Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 17. 
21 Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 109. 
22 Habermas, Logic, p. 136. 
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Habermas insists, however, that learning a language, is both a 
theoretical and practical exercise.23 In other words, the point that 
linguistic analysis misses in wanting to ground the social sciences in 
pure theory is that learning a new language is not just a matter of 
Wittgensteinian “resocialization” but rather a matter of learning “the 
new language of value and practice from the ground up, as it were, by 
virtual participation, as a member, in the activities of a given group.”24 
Habermas claims that learning a new language or form of life is rather 
an issue of mediating between “different patterns of socialization,” 
and therefore that coming to a shared understanding is possible only 
insofar as an alternative form of life can be made meaningful within 
one’s own language.25 
Habermas elaborates the possibility of achieving this consensus 
through Gadamer’s approach to translation. According to Gadamer, 
translation is possible only if a common subject matter exists between 
the translator and whatever he or she is translating. Since learning a 
language requires actually living in it,26 translation is therefore a 
matter of coming to a shared understanding about this subject matter 
as opposed to mastering the other language.27 Similarly, Habermas 
rejects the positivist concept of an ideal metalanguage that provides a 
set of general rules within which the plurality of linguistic frameworks 
operates.28 As above, one does not learn another language simply by 
substituting one set of symbols for another. Instead, one mediates the 
differences between languages by translating one into the other.29 
Thus the translator does not transpose himself or herself into another 
form of life, just as the interpreter does not transpose himself or 
herself into the mind of the author in order to understand a text. The 
translator, Gadamer writes, “must preserve the character of his own 
language, the language into which he is translating, while still 
______________ 
23 Habermas, Logic, p. 135. 
24 Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 110. 
25 Habermas, Logic, p. 137, p. 146. 
26 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 386. 
27 Ibid., p. 387. 
28 Habermas, Logic, p. 132, p. 148. 
29 Sc. Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 11. 
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recognizing the value of the alien, even antagonistic character of the 
text and its expression.”30 
For Habermas, one of the more salient features of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics is therefore its “tendency to self-transcendence that is 
inherent in the practice of language.”31 A shared understanding is 
achieved through a fusion of horizons.32 The framework of each 
individual language and its corresponding worldview thus contains 
within itself the possibility of stepping outside it. It is for this reason, 
Habermas says, that we are never restricted to a single grammatical 
framework. Rather, “the first grammar that one masters also enables 
one to step outside of it and interpret something foreign, to make 
something that is incomprehensible intelligible, to put in one’s own 
words what at first eludes one.”33 Translation is therefore a 
productive activity, in that the assimilation of foreign meanings 
develops the scope of one’s own language and understanding. In this 
way hermeneutics clarifies for Habermas the conditions under which 
the social sciences obtain knowledge as a form of communication and 
consensus.34 
It is by virtue of its character of self-transcendence that Habermas 
claims that hermeneutics, in contrast to the methodology of the 
empirical-analytic sciences, can serve as the basis for the cultural 
sciences. According to his description of the logic of the 
hermeneutical circle, the anticipation of completeness in fore-
knowledge has no “rigorous” content. Rather, the interpretive schema 
that fore-knowledge presupposes works as a hypothesis to be tested 
scientifically in its application within social and practical contexts. In 
this way hermeneutics reveals in ordinary language “the empirical 
content of individuated conditions of life while investigating 
grammatical structures.”35 These grammatical structures provide a 
normative framework for the cultural sciences, the apprehension of 
which develops internally through the operation of social processes. 
______________ 
30 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 388-389. 
31 Habermas, Logic, p. 144. 
32 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 390. 
33 Habermas, Logic, p. 143. 
34 Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 111. 
35 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro 
(London : Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972), p. 173 ; emphasis his. 
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Thus, the transcendental framework of a form of life is approached 
and understood empirically through the interpretation of its own 
language and language games.36 
Despite the contribution that hermeneutics makes to the social 
sciences, Habermas argues that Gadamer overlooks the possibility 
that a consensus will be “systematically distorted” through ideology. 
The problem Habermas identifies is not that understanding can be 
influenced by a prejudice or bias, but rather that hermeneutics lacks 
an appropriate apparatus to critically reflect upon tradition as the 
cause of this prejudice. As Alan How explains, the salient feature of 
Gadamer’s account of language is that he views language as both 
“inwardly and outwardly porous.”37 It is outwardly porous by virtue 
of its ability to translate and appropriate foreign meanings, and 
inwardly porous by virtue of its ability to evaluate its own internal, 
normative structure. For Gadamer, a conversation between two 
people who speak the same language involves minimally an exchange 
of different points of view, and so even here, where there is hardly 
any interruption in meaning, the hermeneutical task of coming to a 
shared understanding is still at work.38 According to Habermas, 
however, Gadamer lends too much authority to tradition, to the point 
of identifying it as an absolute. Consequently, hermeneutic reflection 
loses its power of self-transcendence and thereby its ability to reflect 
upon its own internal, normative structures.39 Without this critical 
apparatus, hermeneutics remains unable to confront those prejudices 
which distort meaning according to some historical ideology from 
those which have a more dynamic function.  
Habermas thus moves the conditions for understanding and 
communication beyond the scope of hermeneutics to include a 
critical apparatus that can locate and reveal the cause of distortions. 
He finds that Freudian psychoanalysis provides the solution to the 
problems surrounding the possibility of distorted communication. 
______________ 
36 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro 
(London : Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1972), p. 194 ; sc. Teigas, 
Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 100. 
37 Alan How, The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social 
(Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1995), p. 123-125. 
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 388-389. 
39 Habermas, Logic, p. 172. 
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Demetrius Teigas summarizes Habermas’s approach to a 
psychoanalytic, controlled interpretation as follows : 
The analyst uses theoretical hypotheses, assumptions, and 
presuppositions which, while they can provide explanatory 
potential, they can, on the other hand, be thought of as 
parts of the overall cycle of a hermeneutical interpretation. 
Instead of moving between the parts and the whole, as in 
the hermeneutical circle, the whole here is understood in 
accordance with a fixed theory ; it is presunderstood in 
specific guidelines which the psychoanalytic theory in use 
dictates. Also, the way in which the parts belong to the 
whole is also supplied by the theory. The symptomatic 
expressions are relayed to specific structures that generate 
them. The distortions can be traced upon explicit 
confusions between the prelinguistic and linguistic 
organization of symbols (as the theory informs us).40 
Whereas hermeneutics proceeds from preconceptions that are 
formed within tradition and elaborates the logic of the hermeneutical 
circle as a reciprocal process between the whole and its parts, the 
process of a controlled interpretation locates a causal relation 
between whole and part according to generalized patterns.41 The 
psychoanalytic approach to a “controlled interpretation” provides the 
cultural sciences with the methodology they require by establishing a 
theoretical framework for evaluating normative behavioral patterns. 
With respect to language, psychoanalysis thereby corrects deformities 
in a language game that has become privatized. The therapist traces 
these “desymbolized” meanings to their original symbolic form, 
allowing the patient to translate them back into public language.42 
With respect to social relations, the patient becomes aware of the 
otherwise unconscious motivations for his or her actions according to 
which he deviates from accepted social paradigms. 
Using psychoanalysis as a model for this reflective activity, the 
social sciences can thereby incorporate dimensions of human action 
______________ 
40 Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 152-153. 
41 Ibid., p. 153. 
42 Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 125. 
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and interest that extend beyond the scope of tradition. This approach 
develops what Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation” – that is, a 
model of communication free from prejudice and distortive 
ideology.43 He claims that language mediates domination and power 
in addition to tradition, thereby necessitating the transition from 
hermeneutical reflection to a critique of ideology.44 The notion of an 
ideal speech situation in effect tries to uphold the Enlightenment 
project of rational, unbiased inquiry against Gadamer’s criticism of 
this approach. It provides a space within which claims can be 
evaluated with certainty of their meaning by organizing these claims 
according to a universalized capacity to articulate meaning, rather 
than leaving this capacity relative to particular groups within a 
society.45 
Lorenzo Simpson’s description of transcendental ethnocentrism 
illustrates the impact that Habermas’s project has for Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics.46 According to Simpson, what a theory of 
transcendental ethnocentrism requires is a transcultural framework 
that does not presuppose transcendental categories of truth and 
meaning, but one that allows an outside observer to interpret the 
meaning of cultural practices without having to adopt their 
______________ 
43 Jürgen Habermas, “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality,” in 
Contemporary Hermeneutics : Method, Philosophy and Critique, ed. Josef Bleicher 
(London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 181-121, here p. 206. 
44 Habermas, Logic, p. 172. 
45 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke 
(Cambridge : The MIT Press, 1998), p. 34-35. 
46 Habermas suggests correctly that the conditions for coming to a shared 
understanding must apply across geographical or cultural distances as well as 
temporal distances (Habermas, Logic, p. 148, p. 151). Gadamer modifies his 
claim in Truth and Method that “only temporal distance can solve the question 
of critique in hermeneutics” to read that “often” temporal distance can 
accomplish this (Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 376, n. 44). While this change 
likely indicates Gadamer’s awareness of the fact that tradition can sometimes 
perpetuate a distorted interpretation (Jean Grondin, “Hermeneutics and 
Relativism,” in Festivals of Interpretation : Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Work, 
ed. Kathleen Wright (Albany : SUNY Press, 1990), p. 42-62, here p. 56), it 
suggests perhaps as well his recognition that the space between familiarity 
and strangeness can occur contemporaneously between different cultural 
groups. 
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ideological background. He proposes that each culture can maintain 
its own internal standards of reasonable social interaction without 
precluding the possibility that these standards can change in light of 
an external claim that they themselves would find reasonable. He 
argues, then, that there is a transcendental demand to approach other 
cultures as being like our own, in that their members also operate 
within and according to their own cultural ideal. In this sense, the 
grounds for critiquing social practices are “internal to the cultural 
horizons that sustain those practices, grounds that make it 
unnecessary that critique appeal to anything beyond the standards of 
rationality and/or central vocabulary of a particular cultural group.”47 
References to transcendental categories of meaning are therefore 
unnecessary in order to offer an internal critique of a cultural identity. 
Similarly, Habermas claims that by recognizing that one’s own 
cultural ideal is not absolute one can evaluate its internal standards 
from an external perspective. As Simpson explains, different cultures, 
“if challenged in ways that are understandable to them, [can] be held 
accountable to reasons that have a non-parochial purchase and that are 
binding for them.”48 Such a claim makes no appeal to transcendental 
categories, but rather appeals to normative standards within each 
cultural form according to what Simpson calls standards of “second-
order rationality.” This is a general form of reasoning that everyone 
possesses by virtue of being a rational agent. Appealing to second-
order rationality thereby makes it possible, Simpson suggests, to 
“intelligibly mark a distinction between what even everyone in a 
particular epistemic community happens to believe and what is, by 
their own lights, reasonable for them to believe.”49 A cross-cultural 
commitment to the standards of second-order rationality therefore 
implies that members of a cultural community must assent to the 
greater force of reason beyond the scope of their own cultural 
tradition where this reason is presented. 
______________ 
47 Lorenzo Simpson, “Critical Fusions : Towards a Genuine ‘Hermeneutics 
of Suspicion,’” in Inheriting Gadamer : New Directions in Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, ed. Georgia Warnke (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 
2016), p. 21-40, here p. 27 ; emphasis his. 
48 Ibid., p. 28 ; emphasis his. 
49 Ibid. ; emphasis his. 
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Habermas argues therefore that, by experiencing the limits of a 
cultural tradition from within, one is able to recognize that tradition is 
not absolute, but is in fact one of many factors that jointly contribute 
to the development of social relations. What is required is therefore a 
framework within which tradition becomes comprehensible in 
relation to the extra-traditional factors that constitute social 
processes, “so that we can indicate the conditions external to 
tradition under which transcendental rules of worldview and action 
change empirically.”50 In his view, Gadamer does not notice that the 
“linguistic structures” of tradition and the “empirical conditions 
under which [these structures] change historically” are not themselves 
mediated by tradition. Rather, the extra-traditional factors manifest 
these things in and through tradition, operating “behind the back of 
language” and so affecting “the very grammatical rules in accordance 
with which we interpret the world.”51 For this reason Habermas 
argues that language, as the medium of tradition, is also a medium of 
domination and social power or labour, which he claims cannot be 
reduced to the kinds of normative relationships manifested in 
tradition. 
According to Habermas, attempts to develop a hermeneutical 
foundation of the cultural sciences have passed over the dialectical 
relationship between universal and particular on which the empirical-
analytic sciences are founded. As a result, the cultural sciences cannot 
properly account for the relation between objectivation and 
experience that this dialectic determines.52 He claims that unless the 
cultural sciences are able to mediate between objectivated modes of 
______________ 
50 Habermas, Logic, p. 174. 
51 Ibid. 
52 As Teigas explains, to “objectivate” something for Habermas “is to give it 
a form in a symbolic system (e.g. within language) so that it can be 
communicated and understood” (Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic 
Understanding, p. 193, n. 40). Partners in a dialogue must therefore objectivate 
the “inner form” of their experience so that it can be understood by the 
other in an outward or explicit expression. Thus “every objectivation is part 
of an intersubjectively valid symbolic structure,” which means that 
“understanding itself is bound to a situation in which at least two subjects 
communicate in a language that allows them to share, that is to make 
communicable through intersubjectively valid symbols, what is absolutely 
unsharable and individual” (Habermas, Knowledge, p. 179). 
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expression, they will remain unable to discriminate between valid and 
invalid or “distorted” forms of communication. As Teigas explain, 
part of Habermas’s task is thus to see “whether there is a different way 
of understanding meaning methodologically, especially the meaning of 
distorted communication, which can avoid and ‘transcend’ the 
hermeneutic understanding.”53 The proper, normative framework of 
the cultural sciences thus requires a marriage between, on the one 
hand, the kind of methodology that an empirical-analytic procedure 
employs in order to obtain certainty and, on the other, the power of 
reflection and self-transcendence inherent in hermeneutics and 
ordinary language.54 
The Hermeneutical Claim to Universality 
Gadamer does not consider the authority of tradition to be 
absolute. He explains that the acceptance of an authority figure is 
always based in reason and not a “subjection and abdication” of 
reason.55 Anyone who has been to a doctor’s office, for example, can 
understand the difference between an uncritical acceptance of 
authority and an irrational one. A patient can have trust in a doctor’s 
expertise more or less uncritically – e.g., without wanting a second 
opinion – but this does not mean that the patient has no reason to 
trust the doctor. Similarly, in Gadamer’s view the timeless quality of a 
classical text is reason enough to give it credence.56 He therefore 
rejects Habermas’s proposed antithesis between tradition and 
reason,57 for there are always reasons to accept an authority even if 
this happens uncritically. The uncritical acceptance of authority is in 
fact an outlying case, and in Gadamer’s view it should not be made to 
imply that certain authority figures are beyond critical examination. 
Indeed, Gadamer maintains that hermeneutical reflection is not just 
capable of bringing into question the prejudices of tradition. In 
response to Habermas’s criticisms, he insists that hermeneutical 
reflection is a universal characteristic of human understanding. 
______________ 
53 Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 147 ; emphasis his. 
54 Sc. How, Habermas-Gadamer, p. 117. 
55 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 281. 
56 Ibid., p. 290. 
57 Sc. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 28, p. 33. 
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Like Habermas, Gadamer wants to avoid the inherent dogmatism 
in the scientific objectification of reality. Following Humboldt, he 
argues that each form of language constructs a “worldview,” and, 
reciprocally, that the essence of language is the world it presents.58 
Gadamer rejects, however, a “world in itself” (Welt an sich) that 
contains the criteria for the development of world and language.59 
Rather, each worldview is a part contained within a whole, which 
does not exist an sich beyond these parts but is rather constituted by 
them : 
In every worldview the existence of the world-in-itself is 
intended. It is the whole to which linguistically schematized 
experience refers. The multiplicity of these worldviews 
does not involve any relativization of the “world.” Rather, 
the world is not different from the views in which it 
presents itself.60 
Similar to Habermas in his approach to forms of life and Simpson 
in his approach to cultural ideals, Gadamer’s approach identifies the 
mediation between different forms of language or worldviews as an 
act of translation or transposition that does not require a priori 
categories of truth. Each worldview can be extended into others, and 
so contains within itself the conditions for understanding the 
worldview presented in another language.61 
Habermas, as we saw, appeals to a transcendental schema that 
encompasses tradition and which can be approached through an 
empirical analysis of language.62 He argues that promoting language as 
a universal medium of understanding causes Gadamer to overlook 
the fact that language must also mediate elements of force and 
domination, which only propagate deceptions within language.63 
Thus, for Habermas, the linguistic presentation of a worldview 
requires a comprehension of language as something that is, on the 
______________ 
58 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 440. 
59 Ibid., p. 444. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 445. 
62 Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 100. 
63 Habermas, Logic, p. 172-173 ; How, Habermas-Gadamer, p. 145. 
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one hand, internal to a cultural tradition, and on the other, situated 
within a larger reference system “so that we can indicate the 
conditions external to tradition under which transcendental rules of 
worldview and action change empirically.”64 
In contrast to Habermas’s empirical analysis of the grammatical 
structure of the lifeworld, Gadamer prioritizes the ontological 
question of the meaning of being as it is available for presentation in 
language. To illustrate the difference between an empirical approach 
and an ontological approach to this question, Gadamer distinguishes 
between aesthetic and historical consciousness, on the one hand, and 
hermeneutical consciousness, on the other. The former modes of 
consciousness, Gadamer explains, attempt to objectify things 
scientifically in order to control or manipulate them. In doing so, the 
aesthetic or historical critic becomes alienated from the ontological 
question of the things themselves, leaving them unable to access this 
primary claim to truth.65 
Gadamer explains that attempts to mitigate this problem by 
developing a “science of hermeneutics” result in the same alienating 
experience that occurs in aesthetic and historical consciousness. The 
goal of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical project, he explains, was to 
develop a method of avoiding misunderstanding. To exclude “by 
controlled, methodical consideration whatever is alien and leads to 
misunderstanding” is not, Gadamer says, an unfair description of the 
hermeneutical task. Nonetheless, this formulation belies a more 
fundamental experience. The possibility of coming to a shared 
understanding, of bridging the gap between familiarity and 
strangeness, already presupposes a consensus : “I may say ‘thou’ and I 
may refer to myself over against a thou, but a common understanding 
[Verständigung] always precedes these situations.”66 Thus, while 
avoiding misunderstanding through a controllable method is certainly 
relevant to hermeneutical interests, “it is only a partial description of a 
comprehensive life-phenomenon that constitutes the ‘we’ that we all 
are.”67 Gadamer claims that the hermeneutical task is therefore to 
overcome the alienating experience of aesthetic and historical 
______________ 
64 Habermas, Logic, p. 174. 
65 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 5. 
66 Ibid., p. 7. 
67 Ibid., p. 8. 
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consciousness and scientific hermeneutics. There is a mode of being 
of the things themselves that is common to these modes of 
experience, he suggests, that precedes any scientific judgment. 
The experience of the things themselves in hermeneutics is a 
negative experience. To explain what this means, Gadamer borrows 
the concept of a “determinate negation” from Hegel.68 The space 
between familiarity and strangeness is where the interpreter 
encounters a different form of language to reflect an otherwise 
familiar concept. In other words, he encounters a different possibility 
of what this concept means for someone. Hegelian dialectic is 
significant for Gadamer because it gives experience the structure of a 
“reversal of consciousness” according to which consciousness has an 
experience of itself. Gadamer quotes Hegel’s explanation of this kind 
of experience : 
The principle of experience contains the infinitely 
important element that in order to accept a content as true, 
the man himself must be present or, more precisely, he 
must find such content in unity and combined with the 
certainty of himself.69 
The concept of experience, Gadamer continues, means just that 
this unity with oneself is established in the reversal of consciousness : 
consciousness “recognizes itself in what is alien and different.”70 
Hegelian dialectical experience is therefore productive with respect to 
the meaning of being, as the “new object [of consciousness] contains 
the truth about the old one.”71 The interpreter obtains a more 
comprehensive knowledge of the matter at hand by understanding for 
himself what this subject matter can mean for someone else. 
Gadamer indicates, however, that the relevance of Hegelian 
dialectic to philosophical hermeneutics does not extend any further. 
He writes that for Hegel, dialectic “must end in that overcoming of 
______________ 
68 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 348. 
69 G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, 
and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), §7 ; 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 348. 
70 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 349. 
71 Ibid. 
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all experience which is attained in absolute knowledge – i.e., in the 
complete identity of consciousness and object.”72 While hermeneutics 
grants the validity of the phenomenological presupposition of the 
prior unity between subject and object, and furthermore has a certain 
implicit teleology insofar as it culminates in “being experienced,”73 it 
always keeps the absolute unity between thinking and being at a 
distance. Our existence is fundamentally historical, and so 
understanding, both of ourselves and of die Sache, cannot be 
complete, as this knowledge is always being developed.74 Gadamer 
wants not to overcome the tension between familiarity and 
strangeness but rather to clarify the conditions under which it remains 
productive for understanding.75 With respect to our historical identity, 
then, “applying Hegel’s dialectic to history, insofar as he regarded it as 
part of the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy, does not do 
justice to hermeneutical consciousness.”76 Experience for Gadamer is 
essentially experience of human finitude and uncertainty.77 
Experience cannot, therefore, culminate in the transcendence of this 
finitude, as this would entail moving beyond history and tradition. As 
above, however, this does not imply that tradition is absolute. Rather, 
genuine experience, as characterized by its essential openness to new 
experience, engenders a radically undogmatic perspective within 
history and tradition. 
Gadamer asserts the primacy of prejudices for hermeneutical 
understanding in light of the historically effected consciousness. It is 
by virtue of the inherent reflective activity of this consciousness that 
prejudices are effective and productive : 
______________ 
72 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 
73 Ibid., p. 350. 
74 Ibid., p. 301. 
75 “Nous fondons la tâche herméneutique précisément sur la tension qui 
existe entre la ‘familiarité’ et le caractère ‘étranger’ du message que nous 
transmet la tradition. […] Ce n’est pas un état psychique mais la ‘chose 
même’ livrée par la tradition qui est l’objet de l’interrogation herméneutique. 
En ce qui concerne le caractère à la fois ‘familier’ et ‘étranger’ des messages 
historiques, l’herméneutique réclame en quelque sorte une ‘position de 
médiateur’” (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Le Problème de la Conscience Historique, ed. 
Pierre Fruchon (Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 1996), p. 85-86). 
76 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 349. 
77 Ibid., p. 351. 
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Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so 
that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity 
of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense 
of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness 
to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we 
experience something – whereby what we encounter says 
something to us.78 
As we saw, one of the more salient features of hermeneutics for 
Habermas is its capacity for “self-transcendence.” In this respect, 
Gadamer finds that he and Habermas share a similar view regarding 
the function of critical reflection. For both hermeneutics and the 
social sciences, the consciousness of effective history is able to 
counter the “naïve objectivism that falsifies not only the positivistic 
theory of science but also any project of laying either a 
phenomenological or language-analytical foundation for sociology.”79 
Gadamer, however, is skeptical of the implication he sees in 
Habermas’s criticism of tradition – namely, that prejudices are only 
ideological, and so, critical reflection functions only to overturn them. 
In his view, Habermas wants to utilize the concept of effective 
history as a way for the social sciences to reflect upon, and so 
emancipate themselves from, their linguistic foundations. By contrast, 
Gadamer argues that this reflective activity does not function outside 
of tradition. Rather, it justifies those prejudices that remain 
productive for the development of hermeneutical consciousness and 
undermines those that do not.80 Consciousness of effective history 
thus performs its own double hermeneutic. It “determines in advance 
both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as 
an object of investigation,”81 and at the same time “seeks to be aware 
of its prejudgments and to control its own preunderstanding.”82 In 
contrast to Habermas, Gadamer therefore claims that the 
consciousness of effective history has the ability both to validate 
______________ 
78 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 9. 
79 Ibid., p. 27. 
80 Ibid., p. 32-33. 
81 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 300. 
82 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 27. 
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legitimate prejudices and to bring into relief elements of dogmatism 
or domination in tradition that otherwise obscure legitimate, historical 
knowledge. For Gadamer this consciousness must have this ability, as 
human experience cannot transcend its own essential historical 
finitude. 
The historically effected consciousness therefore achieves the 
hermeneutical task by elevating tradition to the status of a 
transcendental subject.83 “The true historical object,” Gadamer writes, 
“is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a 
relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality 
of historical understanding.”84 The horizons of the past and present 
thereby constitute “one great horizon that moves from within and 
that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical 
depths of our self-consciousness.”85 The historically effected 
consciousness takes neither a subjective nor an objective stance 
toward history and tradition. True historical knowledge, which the 
fusion of horizons achieves, reflects the fact that the horizons of the 
past and the present constitute a single, historical horizon that 
embraces them both.86 The fusion of horizons thus involves “rising 
to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity 
but also that of the other,” such that acquiring a horizon means that 
“one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to 
look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in 
truer proportion.”87 
______________ 
83 Jean Grondin writes, “La Wirkungsgeschichte décrit le travail (Wirken) de 
l’histoire en général qui prend la place du sujet dans la compréhension. 
L’histoire se trouve ainsi élevée au rang de sujet transcendantal qui rend 
possible la connaissance. On connaît les formules provocantes de Gadamer : 
‘en vérité ce n’est pas l’histoire qui nous appartient, c’est nous qui lui 
appartenons’ (WM, 261) ; ‘le comprendre lui-même doit être considéré 
moins comme une action de la subjectivité que comme une insertion dans le 
procès de la transmission où se médiatisent constamment le passé et le 
présent’ (WM, 274)” (Jean Grondin, “La Conscience du travail de l’histoire 
et le problème de la vérité en herméneutique,” Archives de Philosophie 44, no. 3 
(Juillet-Septembre 1981), p. 435-453, here p. 439). 
84 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 299. 
85 Ibid., p. 303. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p. 304. 
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The development of historical consciousness therefore 
necessitates that each horizon, by virtue of its finitude, be essentially 
open and subject to change via its fusion with another worldview. 
This fusion does not involve forgoing one’s own horizon and 
transposing oneself into a past horizon, just as learning a new 
language does not mean abandoning one’s own. Rather, the notion of 
a transposition between historical frameworks belongs to the naïve 
methodology of historical science, which objectifies the content of 
the past, thereby suspending the relevance of its truth-claim for the 
present situation of the historian.88 This methodological approach 
furthermore undermines the ontological situation of the historian by 
divorcing them from their own historicity, and thus their self-
understanding, which is grounded within tradition. 
For Gadamer, then, the historically effected consciousness is 
intrinsically related to the linguistic presentation of a worldview. As 
such, the constant development of a language and worldview unfolds 
as effective history. Importantly, Gadamer indicates that 
consciousness of effective history implies an awareness of the 
internal, normative guidelines of the linguistic constitution of the 
world : 
The consciousness that is effected by history has its 
fulfillment in what is linguistic. We can learn from the 
sensitive student of language that language, in its life and 
occurrence, must not be thought of as merely changing, 
but rather as something that has a teleology operating 
within it. This means that the words that are formed, the 
means of expression that appear in a language in order to 
say certain things, are not accidentally fixed, since they do 
not once again fall altogether into disuse. Instead, a definite 
articulation of the world is built up – a process that works 
as if guided and one that we can always observe in children 
who are learning to speak.89 
In contrast to Habermas’s claim that “linguistic structures and the 
empirical conditions under which they change historically” remain 
______________ 
88 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 300, p. 302-303. 
89 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 13. 
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external to tradition,90 Gadamer maintains that the formal criteria for 
the objectivity of aesthetic or historical consciousness are themselves 
historically mediated and therefore subject to revision. The historian, 
for example, who approaches history as a critical science is “so little 
separated from the ongoing traditions (for example, those of his 
nation) that he is really himself engaged in contributing to the growth 
and development of the national state.”91 The historian comes to 
understand himself just as much as the historical object. In this 
respect Gadamer states that the historically effected consciousness, 
which achieves self-understanding by bringing our prejudices to the 
fore, is “inevitably more being than consciousness.”92 
It is by virtue of its unique sensitivity to the evident or 
questionable nature of judgments and assertions that Gadamer claims 
that hermeneutical reflection is elevated to the status of a universal.93 
Habermas argues, however, that this ambiguity in language is 
susceptible to pseudocommunication. The psychoanalytic approach 
to a controlled interpretation is meant to reinforce generalized 
patterns that follow a causal relation between universal and particular 
in an ideal speech situation. On this approach it is possible to achieve 
an “unforced universal agreement,” which Habermas claims can 
avoid the possibility of pseudocommunication.94 However, because it 
presupposes an ideal situation for communication, it is questionable if 
this agreement can actually be realized.95 Hypostasizing an ideal form 
______________ 
90 Habermas, Logic, p. 174. 
91 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 28. For the same reason, Gadamer 
claims that Habermas overlooks the fact that his critique of language and 
tradition is itself an act of linguistic and historical reflection (ibid., p. 30). 
92 Ibid., p. 38 ; emphasis his. 
93 By contrast, insofar as psychoanalytic emancipation cannot account for 
cases where tradition is not ideological, it cannot claim the same status 
(Teigas, Knowledge and Hermeneutic Understanding, p. 131). Were it given this 
status, Gadamer argues, this form of reflection would entail the “dissolution 
of all authority” and establish an “anarchistic utopia” in the social sciences 
(Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 42). 
94 Habermas, “The Hermeneutical Claim to Universality,” p. 206. 
95 In several essays written after the publication of Truth and Method, 
Gadamer draws a parallel between the universality of hermeneutical 
reflection and the rhetorical essence of language. He writes, for example, 
that beginning with Plato and Aristotle, rhetoric “has been the only advocate 
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of speech within a clinical setting ignores the fact that outside their 
relationship the analyst and patient are part of a much larger social 
community, whose members all contribute individually to the 
development of social and political processes.96  
For this reason Gadamer claims that psychoanalytic emancipation 
is a specialized form of hermeneutic reflection that has its own 
specific boundaries.97 The hermeneutical relation between whole and 
part, in contrast to a causal relation, is reciprocal. The whole changes 
in light of the meaning of its parts, and the parts in light of the whole. 
This relation is elaborated ontologically, and so operates prior to the 
empirical relation between general and particular that Habermas 
elevates to an ideal. Human understanding and human nature are 
both essentially historical and finite, and so, in becoming experienced, 
“man is ceaselessly forming a new preunderstanding,” which in turn 
is brought into question via hermeneutical reflection.98 This activity, 
Gadamer argues, is an essential feature of understanding, and so 
applies just as much to the natural sciences as it does any other field 
                                                                                                     
of a claim to truth that defends the probable, the eikos (verisimile), and that 
which is convincing to the ordinary reason, against the claim of science to 
accept as true only what can be demonstrated and tested!” (Gadamer, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 24). It is this rhetorical function of language that 
Habermas argues can lead to pseudocommunication. As Grondin explains, 
true understanding for Habermas would be rhetoric-free, which is precisely 
why it is only possible in an ideal situation – i.e., without any possibility that 
meanings could be otherwise. As he puts it, “Mais c’est une autre façon de 
dire que cette vérité non rhétorique ne sera jamais atteinte, ce qui ne nous 
avance pas tellement” (Jean Grondin, “L’Universalité de l’herméneutique et 
de la rhétorique : ses sources dans le passage de Platon à Augustin dans 
‘Vérité et méthode,’” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 54, n° 3 (Septembre 
2000), p. 469-485, here p. 483-484 ; emphasis his).  
96 Warnke suggests that this approach also depends upon a prior distinction 
between normal and abnormal forms of communication and social behavior 
(Warnke, Hermeneutics, p. 127). This distinction is arguably the product of its 
own cultural bias, and so it is questionable how it might be universalized 
within any given cultural group without alienating or marginalizing some of 
its members. 
97 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 41-42. 
98 Ibid., p. 38. 
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by enabling these sciences to bring their own presuppositions into 
question.99 
Conclusion 
Gadamer’s priority of the question, which is essential to the 
hermeneutical claim to universality, presupposes the openness that is 
essential to genuine, hermeneutical experience. In his defence of the 
ubiquity of hermeneutical reflection and the medium of language, 
Gadamer contends that ideology can be more appropriately 
understood “as a form of false linguistic consciousness,” which can 
be made meaningful and intelligible as ideology through 
hermeneutical reflection.100 As part of the presentation of a 
worldview, an ideological form of consciousness takes the form of a 
closed question. The idea or concept guiding this consciousness has 
been restricted dogmatically to a range of allowable meanings, and so 
its understanding of the things themselves is inauthentic.101 
Emancipating the interpreter from this false consciousness also 
emancipates the idea, allowing it to once again assert its own 
meaning – that is, openly and authentically. The reflection that occurs 
as part of a dialogue thus functions as a mode of questioning that can 
see through and avoid forms of dogmatism that distort 
understanding. 
Gadamer is careful to point out that the openness of a question is 
not a total openness. The significance of the question is that what it 
brings into question remains indeterminate. A key feature of this 
indeterminacy is, somewhat paradoxically, its limitation to the nature 
of the subject matter and the scope of possible answers.102 Without a 
limited horizon, the question remains empty (leer) rather than open 
(offen). Its sense remains utterly indeterminate and therefore receptive 
to any interpretation whatsoever. Elsewhere, Gadamer explains that a 
pre-condition for the articulation of meaning is that judgments must 
be made in light of the necessary structure of the things themselves, 
but that this structure becomes manifested through accidents. He 
______________ 
99 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 39. 
100 Ibid., p. 31. 
101 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 356. 
102 Ibid., p. 357. 
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refers to Hegel’s notion of “freedom for all” as the situation in which 
every rational agent can claim to interpret, and therefore to know, 
history. Each claim to historical knowledge is, by nature, accidental, 
as it reflects the individual perspective of each interpreter. These 
claims do not contradict the idea of a necessary, intelligible order, but 
instead highlight aspects of this necessity. History, Gadamer claims, is 
the freedom for all ; it is an “irrefutable principle and yet still requires 
ever anew the effort toward achieving its realization.”103 To 
understand this point, he says, is to understand the “dialectical 
relationship of necessity and contingency.”104 The question of the 
meaning of being develops the same relationship. Properly asked, the 
question is neither closed (so that it coheres with predetermined 
answers), nor empty (so that it has no actual, substantive content). 
Rather, in an authentic dialogue the back-and-forth of question and 
answer has its scope determined by the structure of the subject matter 
in question, but this subject is presented by the dialogue itself—that 
is, by the contingent circumstances of the interlocutors. 
Coming to a shared understanding thus requires a certain art of 
communication. The common subject matter of a dialogue frames the 
conversation between the interlocutors, but obviously they must 
communicate in a way that is mutually understandable. Gadamer 
suggests that there is a dialectic art that pertains to speaking and 
writing that aids thought and understanding by producing clarity in 
one’s intended meaning.105 An essential feature of language in an 
authentic dialogue is its “I-lessness.”106 The interlocutors subordinate 
themselves to their shared subject matter such that any response is 
elicited from the subject matter itself :  
When one enters into dialogue with another person and 
then is carried along further by the dialogue, it is no longer 
the will of the individual person, holding itself back or 
exposing itself, that is determinative. Rather, the law of the 
subject matter [die Sache] is at issue in the dialogue and 
______________ 
103 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, 
trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge : MIT Press, 1981), p. 10. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 394-395. 
106 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 65. 
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elicits statement and counterstatement and in the end plays 
them into each other.107 
Within hermeneutics, then, the “art” of communication achieves a 
shared understanding as the “coming-into-language of the thing 
itself,” and so the shared understanding that is the product of the 
fusion of horizons and the historically effected consciousness is really 
this achievement of language.108 
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